NATO leaders, meeting in Vilnius at a time of unprecedented nuclear risk, took no action to reduce nuclear dangers and instead issued a communiqué continuing to support the use of nuclear weapons. The alliance pointed to the risks posed by Russian nuclear weapons, while praising its own nuclear deterrent and nuclear sharing arrangements. It also criticised the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the only ambit in which progress on nuclear disarmament has been made in decades, demonstrating its preoccupation with the Treaty’s power to stigmatise and eliminate nuclear weapons.
The communiqué, issued at the end of the first day of the Summit, condemns Russia’s deployment of weapons in Belarus and Russia’s “irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and coercive nuclear signals”, while reiterating the Alliance’s willingness to use nuclear weapons itself and its “determination to impose unacceptable costs on an adversary”.
On nuclear sharing
NATO presented its justification for the US deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe, despite democratic and legal challenges to the practice. It also criticised Russia for the same concept: deploying nuclear weapons in Belarus. The communiqué is more explicit on nuclear sharing than previous statements, stating that “NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture also depends on US nuclear weapons deployed in Europe”. But it ignores concerns raised by parliamentarians and citizens of NATO countries. The communiqué repeats NATO’s position that “NATO’s nuclear burden-sharing arrangements have always been fully consistent with the NPT”, despite repeated challenges to this assertion by other NPT members.
Nuclear burden sharing, or the stationing of nuclear weapons in another country, is explicitly prohibited by the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, to which all countries should accede as a matter of urgency to prevent the further deployment of nuclear weapons in other countries.
On the TPNW
The communiqué devoted several sentences to a rebuke of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the only treaty to have adopted a disarmament action plan in more than a decade. NATO’s focus on this treaty demonstrates the alliance’s fear of its ability to undermine the possession, threat of use and stationing of nuclear weapons and to challenge the practice of nuclear deterrence that all NATO members currently engage in. The reality is that there is no inconsistency between the two treaties (NATO and TPNW), only between the practice of nuclear deterrence and adherence to the TPNW.
The communiqué stated that the treaty “is opposed to and inconsistent and incompatible with the Alliance’s nuclear deterrence policy”. However, throughout NATO’s history, alliance members have taken different approaches to armaments and strategy issues, and – as the communiqué itself notes – each nation has the right to choose its own weapons and strategies: Each nation has the right to choose its own security arrangements. There is no legal impediment to NATO members joining the TPNW. Indeed, several NATO countries are participating in the constructive work being done in the TPNW, including by attending the first TPNW Meeting of States Parties in 2022 as observers, among them Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Norway.
The NATO Vilnius Summit could have been an opportunity for member states to demonstrate their commitment to strengthening peace and security by reducing the unacceptably high level of nuclear risk. As nuclear-armed states, states that harbour US nuclear weapons and states that accept the use of nuclear weapons on their behalf, they have the power to agree to end these dangerous practices. Instead, they chose to issue a communiqué with hypocritical and void language on nuclear weapons. Fortunately, the member states of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons will meet at the end of November to take real steps for it to address nuclear dangers and move towards disarmament.
