Instability and rising living costs have caused significant growth in refugee and other migrant numbers globally. The opportunity to exploit the crisis will not be missed by other countries, most notably Russia.

By John P. Ruehl

Since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, more than 7 million Ukrainian refugees have left the country till mid-June. While some 1.5 million ended up in Russia, the rest have mostly entered the European Union, where they have been granted the right to live and work for up to three years, in addition to receiving welfare, education, housing, food, and medical assistance.

The EU has spent more than €6 billion in aid to Ukraine since the start of the conflict, and its support for Ukrainian refugees could cost tens of billions of euros this year. Brussels and various EU countries will spend billions more before the war is over, and to help with reconstruction efforts in the country afterward.

However, with rising living costs since the pandemic that have accelerated since the launch of Russia’s invasion, European governments are sensitive to perceptions that they are not doing enough to secure the well-being of their own citizens. And even with the substantial aid so far, the millions of Ukrainian refugees have begun to strain European social services, particularly in Poland, where almost 5 million Ukrainian refugees have traveled to or passed through.

Resentment toward refugees can build quickly, even in countries with seemingly similar cultures. In Turkey, for example, 72 percent of the population showed support for refugees from neighboring Syria in 2016, while by 2019, 80 percent indicated that they preferred for Syrian refugees to be repatriated.

The tension between Turkish citizens and refugees from Syria, as well as those from Afghanistan and other countries, has been documented for years in Turkey. The presence of these refugees continues to be a major source of political and social agitation in the country.

Poland and Ukraine, meanwhile, have their own historical disputes, and political criticism has risen against Ukrainian refugees in Poland and in other European countries. Russian media outlets have also spread disinformation to fan the flames of anti-Ukrainian sentiment across the continent.

Roughly 1.5 million Ukrainian refugees have returned to their native country since the outbreak of the conflict. But more than 7 million Ukrainians remain internally displaced, and vulnerable to another military escalation in the war. The Biden administration’s offer to take 100,000Ukrainian refugees will do little to help solve this concern, and Ukrainians are unlikely to find many other places outside Europe where they can travel to in large numbers.

The Ukrainian refugee crisis has also coincided with a growing number of displaced people worldwide over the last decade. From 2011-2021, their numbers ballooned from 38.5 million to 89 million. Weeks into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the United Nations refugee agency, UNHCR, announced that the number of people forcibly displaced had exceeded 100 million for the first time.

The 2015 European migrant crisis revealed how instability in surrounding regions could rapidly increase people’s flows to the continent. That year, 1.3 million people applied for asylum in the EU, roughly half of them fleeing violence in Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Additionally, other refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants came from Kosovo, Albania, Pakistan, Eritrea, Nigeria, Iran, and dozens of other countries.

Across the EU, there was significant disapproval toward the institution’s handling of the refugee crisis. It resulted in a rise of reactionary right-wing political sentiment and strengthened policies against refugee and migrant intake. Frontex, the EU’s border and coastal guard protection agency, also massively increased its powers, budget, and personnel numbers.

But the crisis was also exacerbated by countries seeking to more openly test the EU’s vulnerability to migration. As a primary route for migrants to Europe, Turkey leveraged refugee and migrant flows to gain monetary and political concessions from the EU. In 2017, migration to Spain from Morocco, another important transit country to Europe, spiked as the Moroccan government was locked in a dispute with the EU over a free trade deal.

Having seen the effects of violence and Libyan wars on migration, the Kremlin also understood its intervention in the Syrian civil war would cause another surge of people to Europe. Supporting the political and social instability across the continent as a result of the refugee crisis fits neatly into Russia’s attempts to challenge the West.

But despite being far off the beaten path of usual immigration to Europe, the Kremlin has also had a hand in directly assisting migrant and refugee flows.

In 2015, Finnish and Norwegian border authorities accused the Kremlin of involvement in the arrival of hundreds of migrants from the Middle East who crossed their borders from Russia. Both Finland and Norway are bound by stricter refugee and migrant acceptance laws than Russia and could do little as Russian border guards refused to take them back.

Russia’s attempts to bring refugees into Europe have continued for years. But in 2021, the Kremlin expanded its efforts considerably with the help of Belarus. Having faced increasing tensions over sanctions from the EU, Belarus also began sending migrants into the Schengen Area through its borders with Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania, with Russian assistance.

Renatas Požela, former commander of the Lithuanian border guards, declared in 2017 that Russia plays a major role in moving migrants from Russia and Belarus into Lithuania. However, their numbers were relatively small, with 104 people detained in 2018, 46 in 2019, and 81 in 2020. But in 2021, Lithuania alone detained more than 4,100 “illegal migrants, mostly from Syria and Iraq.”

The ongoing crises have eroded the EU’s commitment to upholding laws on refugee and migrant rights, and Brussels has faced growing criticismover its policies from human rights organizations in recent years.

But the Kremlin’s tactics have expanded from simply attempting to undermine European social and political stability. As with energy and food, refugee and migrant flows will be utilized by Russia to weaken Western support for Ukraine and its war effort.

Around the world, conflict and rising living costs have caused great instability. In Europe’s periphery, the people from Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Syria, and Yemen are noted as being particularly vulnerable to forcible displacement due to the circumstances in these countries.

Meanwhile, across the Middle East, which receives a substantial part of its grain from Russia and Ukraine, the effects of the war have also worsened food insecurity and could further increase refugee and migrant flows.

The leader of Italy’s League party and former Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini said on June 6 that food insecurity and economic instability, as a result of the war in Ukraine, could lead to half a billion refugees and migrants heading to Europe. While it is difficult to put an exact number on how many people will travel to Europe, growing instability will clearly increase migrant flows from nearby regions.

European countries, and the EU itself, have hastily turned to offshore processing centers to resettle migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees outside the continent in the last few years. But the underdevelopment of these systems, as well as the limitations of Frontex, means Europe will again be incapable of stemming a significant increase in flows of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers.

Additionally, Turkey already hosts the world’s largest population of refugees and asylum seekers, and Ankara is unexpected to take many more. The world has also seen how Europe was able to absorb millions of Ukrainians relatively quickly, and there will be pressure on the EU to also accept non-European migrants and refugees.

Western sanctions and other measures to punish Russia for invading Ukraine have in turn exacerbated the situation being felt in global energy and food markets, while much of the ongoing violence across the Middle East has partly stemmed from the foreign policies of Western countries since the turn of the century.

Since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Europe has endured rising inflation, growing food and energy costs, and an influx of refugees. But the effects of the war are amplifying these forces globally, and the Kremlin will do all it can to add to the refugee crisis in Europe and pressure the EU to end its support for Ukraine.

This article was produced by Globetrotter.

John P. Ruehl is an Australian-American journalist living in Washington, D.C. He is a contributing editor to Strategic Policy and a contributor to several other foreign affairs publications. He is currently finishing a book on Russia to be published in 2022.